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ACCIDENT INSURANE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY-EFFECT OF PRIOR ADJUDI-
CATION-FIDELITY AND CASUALTY Co. v. LOWENSTEIN, 97 Fed. 17.-A provision
in an insurance policy was as follows: "This insurance does not cover * *
* injuries, fatal or otherwise, resulting from poison, or anything accidentally
or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled." The holder of this
policy died from accidental inhaling of gas. Previous decisions had held that
such a provision did not exempt the company from liability for death of per-
son insured. Held, that the court would hold the same view regardless of
what it might hold if the question was res integra Sandborn J.. dissenting.
The law is that where a provision in an insurance policy states that the
company is relieved from liability for deaths from poison it refers only to cases
where the poison is purposely taken, not to cases where it is accidentally taken.
In the latter case the company is still held liable. MfcGlother v. P;oident
Mutual Accid. Co., 6o U. S. Appl. 705. This view of the law seems to have
been in the minds of the insurance company, and they had apparently made
provision for it in the present case. It would seem, therefore, that the law, as
we have laid it down, is not applicable. Its application is apparently confined
to cases where the provision leaves it doubtful as to whether the insurance com-
pany desires to relieve itself from accidental poisoning, or from cases where
poison is purposely taken. No such ambiguity occurs in the present case; but
the court apparently takes no notice of this fact.
A.NTI-TRUST LAW-POWER OF CONGRESS To RsEsTricT CoNTRACTs In RE-
STRAINT OF INTERSTATE COMMERE-ADDYSTON PIPE AND ST=EL Co. V. U. S.,
2o Sup. Ct Rep. 96.-A combination of cast-iron pipe concerns to regulate the
bidding for contracts for sale in various States of the Union of pipe to be
manufactured by the successful bidder is in violation of the anti-trust law.
Congress has power to legislate against such contracts. See CouorzNT. p. 170.
COMMON CARRIERS-BILL OF LADING-HuTKoFF V. PENNSYLVANIA R. R. Co.,
61 N. Y. Sup. 254.-A provision in a bill of lading that the carrier shall not be
liable for any loss or breakage does not exempt the carrier from the conse-
quences of its own negligence.
Contrary to the general rule the New York courts allow a common carrier,
by special contract, to stipulate for exemption from liability even for losses
resulting from its own negligence. Perkins v. Hudson Ri-ver R. Co.. 24 N.
Y. 196. 82 Am. Dec. 282; Nicholas v. New York Central. etc., R. R. Co.,
89 N. Y. 37o. Such contracts are not favored, however, and in order to have
such an effect must be plainly and distinctly expressed, so that they cannot be
misunderstood by the shipper. Maguire v. Dins-more, 56 N. Y. 168. Every
matter of doubt under such a contract will be solved in favor of the shipper,
and where general words limiting the liability of the carrier may be given a
reasonable meaning without making them include losses caused by the negli-
gence of the carrier, they will not be construed as granting an exception from
such liability. Rathbone v. N. Y. C. R. 1R. Co., 14o N. Y. 48; Kennei, v. N.
Y. C. -R. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 422. In the present case the phrase "any'loss or
breakage" is a general one, and the court construes it according to the rule
just mentioned. Sfiecial exfpressOrovisin against liability for negligence is
the only means by which the carrier can avoid such liability. N icholas v. N.
Y. C. R. R. Co., 8q N. Y. 370.
COMMON CARRIERS-CONTRACTS LIMITING LIABIIMTY-NEGLIGENGE-MARQUIS
ET A.. V. WOOD, 6i N. Y. Sup. 251.-A contract for the transportation of
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goods, stipulating that the carrier shall not be liable for any damage in excess
of a specified amount, does not, by the attempt to limit the carrier's liability,
relieve it from liability for a loss occasioned by its negligence.
Carriers and shippers may agree upon a certain valuation for property
when it is delivered for transportation. Such an agreement is binding, how-
ever the loss may be caused, provided it gives the bona fide value of the goods
fixed by consent of both parties. Hart v. P. R. R. Co., IX2 U. S. 331; Graves
v. Lake Shore R. R. Co., 137 Mass. 33.
Where, however, the loss is caused by the carrier's negligence, and the*
stipulation limiting the amount of the carrier's liability fixes an arbitrary
value printed in all bills of lading, and concerning the fairness of which the
shipper has not been questioned, such stipulation is generally invalid. Encyl.
of Law V, 133.
In most States where a carrier is not allowed to stipulate for total exemp-
tion from liability for a loss caused by its negligence, a stipulation limitiZg its
liability for such loss would also doubtless be held void. Chicago Ay. Co. v.
Chafiman, 133 Ill. 96; Muller v. P. R. R. Co, 134 Pa. 31n. But in Richmond,
etc.. R. R. Co. v. Payne, 86 Va. 48. it was held that a carrier might by con-
tract linit its liability for loss caused by its negligence, though it could not
exempt itself wholly.
In New York, where carriers can exempt themselves from all liability for
negligence, they certainly can also limit the amount recoverable for negli-
gence. Belger v. Dinsmore. 5i N. Y. x66. They must, however, expressly
state that the limitation or liability is to cover losses by negligence. No gen-
eral term like "any damage," as used in the present case, will be sufficient; 89
N. Y. 370.
COMMON CARRIERS-JUDIcIAL NOTICE-CusToM--MC]BBIN ET AL. v. GREAT
NORTHERN Ry. Co., 80 N. W. 1052 (Minn.).-In this case the court took
judicial notice of a general custom in regard to baggage operating in favor of
the plaintiff. It, however, required him to show that the general custom con-
trolled in the particular case, by proving affirmatively that there were no
special conditions or limitations imposed upon it by the defendant railroad
company in its dealings with hir.
This requirement is criticized in a dissenting opinion, which says: "If the
conditions and limitations referred to are a part of the general custom, we
should take judicial notice of them also. If they are not a part of such general
custom, but are restrictions placed on the general custom by the particular
railroad company, then the burden was on it to plead and prove the particular
limitation or condition so placed by it on the carrying of sample cases."
The court having taken judicial notice of a general custom apparently
establishing the plaintiff's case, the burden would then appear to be on the
defendant to show any exceptions to the general custom in its favor.
CORPORATIONS - EMPLOYES - WAGES- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-
SA'rTE v. HAUN, 59 Pac. 34o. (Kan.).-Statute of 1897, I. Chapter 145, provides
that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, company, corporation or agent
thereof, to pay any employ6 any wages except in lawful money or by check
or draft. Section second of the act provides that any other mode of payment
is void and shall be construed as coercion. By section four the act is made to
apply only to corporations or " trusts" or their agents that employ ten or more
persons. Held, that the act is unconstitutional and void, in that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which pro-
vides that it shall not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
That injustice would result from the enforcement of such an act must be
obvious, for by its provision it is not unlawful for any person excepting a cor-
poration which employs ten or more persons to coerce an employ6. The point
is made that "the same act of the same man would be unlawful to-day if his
employer was a corporation or trust and employed ten men, while to-morrow
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it would be lawful, provided in the meantime the corporation had discharged
one of its employ6s.
The fact that a laborer shall not be allowed to exchange labor for the
commodities of life seems a most startling proposition. Godcharles v. Wige-
man, 113 Pa. 431-437.
C. J. Darter dissents on authority of Shafler v. Mning Co.. 55 Md. 74,
and Budd v. New York, 148 U. S. 517. In the former case, which was similar
to the one under review, the court held the statute to be valid, as the Legisla-
ture reserved the right to amend the charter of a corporation. In the latter it
was held that a law which applied to elevator owners in places of 130.000inhabitants, and did not apply to places of less population, was not an unjustdiscrimination.
EVIDENCE-UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED--BACON V. UNITED STATES, 97 Fed.
35.-A letter written by the comptroller of the currency to the president of a
national bank was wrongfully taken from his private box and given to the
officers of the United States. Held, that such letter was admissible in evi-
dence on the part of the government in a prosecution of the president
This point is. no doubt, decided according to weight of authority. Com-
monwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc (Mass.) 329. 337; State v. Griswold, 67 Conn.
290. While we appreciate the grounds on which these cases are decided. yet
the admission of these papers as evidence will allow the person who offers
them to profit by his own wrong. Violence will be done to the very spirit of
the IVth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of those private
actions that can be brought against an invasion of one's right to his papers.The aim of that rule which says a person shall not be compelled in a criminal
case to give evidence against himself is destroyed. The dissenting opinion ofBaldwin, J., in State v. Griswold above, although in a case not directly inpoint, is a strong expression of the view opposed to what has been generally
held on this point.
EVIDENCE-VARYING RECEiPTs-ToWER v. BLESSING, 6I N. Y. Sup. 25S.-
A receipt of a sum, "in full of all demands to date" is not conclusive on the
party executing it. but it may be contradicted or explained by parol evidence.
This decision is in conformity with the rule adopted by the New York courtsin regard to receipts in full. They make no distinction between a receipt for
a specified sum and a receipt in full. Both furnish only Prima fade evidence
and both are equally open to explanation and contradiction. Ryan v. Ward,48 N. Y. 2o4. As a general rule a receipt in full is much more conclusive than
a simple receipt. Bouvier's Dictionary. In general a receipt in full is con-
clusive when given with a knowledge of all the circumstances, and when aparty giving it cannot complain of any misapprehension as to the compromise
he was making; 52 Ill., 183; 63 Mich. 69o.
In Connecticut a receipt in full will operate as a discharge to defeat anyfurther claims, unless executed under such circumstances of mistake, accident
or fraud as will authorize a court of equity to set it aside. Fuller v. Critten-
den, 9 Conn. 4oi; Aborn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444.
IN'ERPRETATiON-AcT REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF MEDIC E-OSTE-
OPATHY-NOT AN AGENCY WITHIN THE MEANING OF 92 OHIO LAws 44-STATE
v. LIFFEING. 55 N. E. 168 (Ohio).-The language of the act is "Any person
shall be regarded as practicing medicine or surgery within the meaning of this
act, who shall append the letters M.B. or M.D. to his name or for a fee pre-
scribe, direct, or recommend for the use of any person any drug or medicine
or other agency for the treatment, cure or relief of any wound, fracture or
bodily infirmity or disease." Liffring was indicted for practicing without a
a certificate. The indictment was based upon the fact that he had for a fee
prescribed osteopathy-defined in the case as a system of rubbing or kneading
portions of the body--as a cure for a certain disease. The fact was admitted,
but it was held not an agency within the meaning of the act.
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The intention of the Legislature must be presumed to have been'to pro-
tect the public from dangerous drugs, medicines, or other agencies in unskilled
hands. This intention must be paramount. U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 399.
JUDGES-INTEREsT-DIsQUALIFiCATION-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF RAPID
CITY v. McGuIRE, 8o N. W. 1074 (S. D ).-An action of foreclosure was brought
by a corporation before a circuit judge whose wife was a stockholder in the
corporation. Held, that the judge was disqualified to try the cause on the
ground of personal interest, since his wife, though not a party to the suit, was
directly interested in the result, and since he, though under the law of the
State having no present interest in, or control over his wife's property, would
yet succeed to a portion of it in case of her death, and would be, in law, pre-
sumptively an heir to her estate.
This decision rests purely upon common law grounds, there being no con-
stitutional provision or statute in South Dakota cisqualifying a judge from sit-
ting in a cause on the ground of interest, or of relationship to a party. At
common law relationship to a party was not a disqualification (Am. and Eng.
Encyc., Vol. 12, p. 47), so that the question of pecuniary interest of the judge
was the only one to be considered. We have found no case involving precisely
the question here.
MANDAius-CoRPORATION-IN RE PIERsON, 60 N. Y. Sup. 671.-Mandamus
to compel a corporation to allow petitioner, a stockholder, to examine its
books, to see if it is not selling gas at a loss, is properly denied, it being
shown that it has cut the price of gas to meet competition, and thus retain
its customers, and there being no advantage to the stockholders or the com-
pany in an application to the attorney-general or for a receiver, which the
petitioner proposes to make if he finds that such sale is being made at a loss.
The right of a member of a corporation to inspect the books of the com-
pany for proper purposes is well settled in the U. S. I far. Priv. Carot., and
mandamus is the proper remedy. But in this case the purpose was not
deemed a proper one. Members of a corporation have no right on speculative
grounds to call for an examination of the books in order to see if, by any pos-
sibility, the company's affairs may be administered better than they think they
are at present. King v. Masters and Wardens of the Merchant Tailors Co.,
2 Barn. &- Adol. uiS.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-PUBLIC IXPRo r MrNTs-CoNsTRucrxoN OF VIA-
DUCT-DAMAGES--LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY-SAUER v. MAYOR, ETC., OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, 6o N. Y. Sup. 648.-Held, city is liable to abutting
owner for damages caused by erection of viaduct in the street in front of his
premises, by which he is deprived of easement of light, air and access.
The question was whether such damages came within the clause of the
New York Constitution, which says -private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. ' In other words, was this a taking of
.property? The court held that the rights of abutting owners are in the nature
of easements. Easements are property, and therefore cannot be taken with-
out compensation. Kane v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 125, N. Y. 164.
Under the same constitutional provision a different result was reached in
other States. In Illinois, under the old Constitution, an abutting owner could
not recover for consequential injuries, but only for direct jhhysical injury to
his property. Rigney v. Chicago. 102 ILl. 64.
But the corresponding clause in the present Constitution of Illinois,
adopted in 18.70, says "private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without compensation." Similar clauses are found in a number of
State constitutions adopted since x87o, and where this is so the decisions are
uniform to the effect that, in a case like the present, the abutting owner may
recover.
RECENT CASES.
MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANcE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIE5-OvEaHISER ET
AL. v. OVERHISER, 59 Pac. 75 (Colo.).-The A. 0. U. W. by-laws provide tlat the
beneficiary shall be named in the certificate and shall be within one of certain
designated classes, and in case of death, provides that the fund shall go to
certain heirs in the absence of any direction by the insured. A wife obtained
a divorce prior to the death of her husband, who held an insurance in the
above-named society. Held, that divorce was not the legal equivalent to the
death of the beneficiary and that the heirs could not take the fund.
There seems to be a wide diversity of opinion by jurists on this question.
A wife. where divorced, has generally lost her rights. Tyler v. Odd Fel-
lows' Mut. Relief Assoc., 154 Mass. '34. Nevertheless, tie decision in the
case under review seems correct. The contract of insurance did not need any
interpretation, and when entered into the beneficiary was competent to take
under the by-laws. Nor was there any prohibition in the by-laws incapaci-
tating the beneficiary from taking the fund owing to a legal ieparation. It is
a well-known principle that the courts treat a policy of life insurance as some-
thing like a testament. Bolton v. Bolton. 73 Me. 2Q9. Construing the policy
as a will, the beneficiary named therein would take, as the insured failed to
revoke the instrument by the designation of a new beneficiary.
NEw TRIAL-NwiLY-DIsCOvERED EVIDENCE-HILL V. STATE. 53 S. W. 845
(Tex.).-Where defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of newly-dis-
covered evidence to prove insanity. Held, that it should be granted, though
in strictness the evidence was not newly-discovered.
We are unable to find authorities in any State except Texas which have
followed this exception to the rule for a new trial upon newly-discovered
evidence, where the plea is insanity. In Texas this exception 'ias made in
Schuenler v. State, 19 Texas, App. 872, and followed in Horhouse v. State,
50 S. W. 362, and the Texas courts seem disposed to strengthen these prece-
dents.
PERSONAL INJURIES-TRIAL-PHYsIcAL EXAMINATION-WANCK V. Crr OF
WINONA, So N. W. 851 (Minn.).-Held, in an action to recover damages for a
personal injury, that the trial court, upon application by the defendant, could
order the plaintiff to submit himself to a physical examination by disinterested
physicians, under penalty of having his suit dismissed upon refusal to obey;
and that the court erred in refusing to so order, though defendant's physician
had previously attended plaintiff, and had opportunity to examine him.
The rule here laid down accords with that in many States, but conflicts
with that in others, and with that applied by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, where it is asserted
that no such power is vested in the court, either by the common law or by act
of Congress. Justice Brewer. however, in a dissenting opinion, lays down a
rule very like that given in the present case. He says: "It is said that there
is a sanctity of person which may not be outraged. We believe that truth and
justice are more sacred than any personal consideration."
PRESUMPTION As TO COMMON LAw-SisTER STATEs-BLETHf-n v. Bo.',Ra ET
AL., 53 S. W. ioi6 (Tex.).-Where the Constitution of Massachusetts. adopted
in 1780, providing that all laws previously adopted in the Colony of Massa-
chusetts Bay and usually practiced in the courts of law shall remain in full
force until repealed by the Legislature, such parts only excepted as are repug-
nant to the Constitution, was offered in evidence. Held, to be insufficient
proof in an action in Texas to establish the fact that the common law was in
force when such Constitution was adopted.
It has been a familiar rule that the courts of one State will presume the
common law to be in force in a sister State at a given time, in the absence of
evidence. The Texas courts do not follow it, however, and say in this case
tnat they do not believe the " indulgence in presumptions" the safest guide.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO COMMEMT UPON
FAILURE TO CALL FAMILY PHYSICIAN-CITY OF WARSAW V. FISHER, 55 N. E.
42 (Ind.).-Held, that in an action for damages resulting from personal injuries,
counsel for defendant may properly comment upon plaintiff's failure to call as
a witness his attending physician. See COMMENT, p. 171.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES-KNOXVILLE TRACTION Co. v. LANE ET UX., 53 S. W. 557
(Tenn.).-Where plaintiff, while a passenger on defendants' street car, was
insulted by motorman. Held, that the jury might find exemplary damages,
although the company did not authorize nor ratify the act and was innocent
of any negligence.
There are two rules for the liability of a corporation in exemplary damages
for the acts of its servants. The prevailing one holds the corporation liable
where the servant or agent would be liable to such damages. Goddard v.
Railway Co., 57 Me. 202. The other requires the corporation to ratify or
authorize the act. Hale on Damages, p. 219; Turner v. R. Co., 34 Cal.
594. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in this case insists that the true reason
for allowing such damages is solely the breach of the contractual relation
between plaintiff and the company. The rule seems severe, as it demands
nothing more nor less of a corporation than supernatural foresight in selection
of employ6s.
RAILROADS-AssUMPTION OF RISKS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE -YOUNG
ET AL V. SYRACUSE, B. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y., Supp. 202.-A switch was
so placed that it could be seen only 6o feet away. The engineer who ran into
the switch when open had been on the road about fourteen years, knew of the
position of the switch and the company rule that it should be approached With
great care. Held, whether engineer assumed risk of employment or was
guilty of negligence was a question for the jury. Smith, J., dissenting.
This is a close case on the point of what a court is to consider a matter of
law and what it is to leave to a jury. We take it that the principles on which
this case is decided are well settled; that the rule in Pautzer v. Till), Fos-
ter Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 368, 2 N. E 24, as to a workman's presupposing his
master to have provided safe appliances, is modified by an employ6's know-
ing of an obvious defect, making no objection and continuing in employment.
Krog v. Chicago, 32 Iowa 357. But the defect must be obvious and of such a
kind that the injured person could have kept its dangerous character in mind
without an effort.
STREET RAILROADS-CONTRIBuTORY NEGLIGENCE-BRAINARD V. NASSAU
ELECTRIC R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. Sup. 74.-A man who surrenders his seat on a
crowded street car to a woman and stands on the running board of the car, is
not, as a matter of law, negligent. Riding on the running board of a crowded
street car is not per se negligence.
Both of the points decided are somewhat novel in character. Surrender-
ing one's seat to another passenger does not constitute contribuory negligence
as a matter of law. Such question is usually one of fact and depends upon
the circumstances. Lehr v. R. R. Co., x8 N. Y. 556. 23 N. E. 889; Still v.
R. R. CO., 52 N. Y. Sup. 975. In the present case the surrender was made to
a woman who may be presumed to have been weaker than the deceased.
The words of Hatch, J., are worthy of note: "Custom, even at Coney Island,
has not deadened all sense of courtesy, and if it had, we should continue to
think that the law of negligence has still a sufficient respect for the amenities
of life as notter se to charge as negligence the surrender of a seat by a man
to a woman.
SUITS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS FOR OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT-LAw GIVING
RIGHT TO BE INDEMNI1FIED BY MUNICIPALITY UNCONSTITUTIONAL-IN RE JEN.
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SEN. 6o N. Y. Supp. 9 3 3 .- Held, that a law, retrospective in its nature,
enabling public officials to be indemnified by the municipality, for reasonable
counsel fees and expenses paid or incurred in successfully defending prosecu-
tions against them for official misconduct, is unconstitutional. See COMMENT,
p. 173.
TAXATIoN-SITUS OF NOTES AND MORTGAGES OWNED BY A NON-RESIDENT
-NEW ORLEANS V. STEIMPLE, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. iio.-Held, notes and mort-
gages in the hands of an agent for collection and deposit are subject to taxa-
tion where found, irrespective of the domicile of the owner.
While this has been the doctrine in many States, it has not been affirmed
before by the Supreme Court. Bank notes and municipal bonds, it is well
settled, are sufficiently tangible to be taxed where found. The Supreme
Court has held, too. that shares of stock in national banks may for purposes of
taxation have a situs of their own, Tafifian v. Merchants' N at. B'k, Ig Way
490; and that a State may tax the interest in land in the State of a non-resi-
dent mortgagee. Savings and Loan Soc. v. Multnomah County, x69 U. S.
421; but that bonds, mortgages and debts generally have no situs independent
of the domicile of the owner. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall
30o. The last is here construed not be a denial of the power of the Legisla-
ture to establish such independent situs for bonds and mortgages The words
of the court go beyond the authorities and the necessities of the facts in
hand, and would cover any case where the bonds and mortgages are found
in the State. whether in the possession of an agent or not. It would seem
that they should not be taxed irrespective of the domicile of the owner unless
they have acquired some sort of a permanent business situs.
VICE-PRINCIPAL-CNDUCTOR OF A FREIGHT TRAIN-NEw ENGLAND R. R.
CO. v. CONROY, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85.-Held, the conductor of a freight train is
not a vice-principal so as to make the company liable for the injuries of a
fellow-servant caused by his neligence. Chicago, f. - St. P. R. Co. v. Ross,
112 U. S. 377. overruled. Justice Harlan dissents. See Comsxr2,, p 174.
WITNESS-IMPEACHMENT-TRIAL-STATEMENTS IN ARGUMENT-BECKER v.
CAIN, So N. WV. 805 (N. D.).-In this action the defendant attempted to im-
peach the testimony of the plaintiff as to his ownership of certain goods, by
proving a statement made by the plaintiff in his argument as attorney in a
previous action, inconsistent with such testimony, which statement, upon
cross-examination, the plaintiff denied having made. Held. that such state-
ment was inadmissible as evidence in the present action, and so incompetent
to impeach plaintiff's testimony.
This is an interesting application of the rule that statements of an attor-
ney in his argument are statements, not of fact. but of the evidence in the
case, and what, in his opinion, that evidence tends to prove. The statement
being thus irrelevent to the issue, it was accordingly inamissible for the pur-
pose of discrediting the witness. I Greenleaf Evid., Sec. 449.
